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BUILDING BLOCKS OF MARKET CLEARING BUSINESS CYCLE MODELS
ABSTRACT
We compare "real business cycle" and increasing returns models of
economic fluctuations.In these models, business cycles are driven by
productivity changes resulting either from technology shocks or from crucial
building blocks that give both types of models hope of fitting the data.
These building blocks include durability of goods, specialized labor,
imperfect credit and elastic labor supply.We also present new evidence on
comovernent of both outputs sand labor inputs across sectors and onthe
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Chicago, IL60637I. Introduction
The paperdiscussesmarket clearing real business cycle models. In these models,
economic fluctuations are characterized by movements along a stable labor supply curve. As a
result, real wages and labor input both move together with output. Although the procyclical
behavior of real wages has been debated, the current consensus seems to be that real wages are
moderately procyclical (Bits 1985, Kydland and Prescott 1988, Solon and Baraky 1988).
There are four separate classes of explanations of procyclical real wages in a
decentralized market clearing framework. In the first three explanations, labor productivity is
procyclical, and real wages follow productivity. These three explanations can be summarized by
writing the production function:
y(f) —i(f)F(K(t),L(t)),
where -y is the technological shock, K is capital, L is labor, and y is output at time t.Labor
productivity at time f can be high if either (a) the productivity shock 'ishigh at time t, or (b) the
capital stock is high at time t, or (c) the labor input is high at time f, and production function
exhibits increasing returns to scale. The first explanation of high productivity in booms drives
the real business cycle theories of Kydland and Prescott (1982), Long and Plosser (1983), and
Prescott (1986). The second explanation is the basis of models in which booms result from
increases in the capital stock. Shleifer (1986) and Kiyotaki (1988) present examples of such
models where increasing returns help generate endogenous fluctuations, but the driving force
behind output fluctuations over time is really the changes in the capital stock. The third
explanation of procydical productivity is increasing returns in the form of declining marginal
cost, either at an industry or at an economy-wide level. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) is
an example of such a model.
Procyclical productivity is not the only way to generate procyclical real wages; counter-
cyclical markups of price over cost also give this result.In some models (Phelps and Winter 1970,
Okun 1981, Stiglitz 1984, Bils 1986), demand becomes less elastic during recessions, perhaps3
because customers with elastic demand leave the market, and so optimal markups rise.In other
models (Weitzman 1982, Solow 1984, Haxnmour l988, markets are monopolistically competitive
and the price is tied to the average cost which falls in a larger market. As a result, markups fall
in the boom and real wages are procyclical. In yet another approach (Rotemberg and Saloner
1986), competition between oligopolists intensifies and markips fall in a boom. In all these
models—whether or not they assume increasing returns—procyclical real wages result from
countercycical markups and not from procyclical marginal productivity. These models should be
distinguished from those with real wages driven by procyclical productivity.
In this paper, we focus on the comparison of increasing returns (IR) and technological
shock (TS) real business cycle models. We spend relatively little time on models driven by
changes in the capital stock. Although additions to the capital stock probably raise productivity
in the later stages of the boom, capital stock changes cannot explain all of the business cycle,
particularly productivity movements during periods and in sectors of no capacity addition. We
also do not spend much time on countercycical markup stories, although we do find them
attractive. The main reason for this omission i that our own work has focused on IR models. We
also do not deal with models that do not fit into the market clearing framework. Some of the
relevant papers (Roberts 1987, Heller 1986) replace perfectly functioning markets with market
games; others (Cooper and Haltiwanger 1988) present centrally planned allocations.Finally, we
do not focus on models where prices are rigid or costly to change; these models have been
surveyed by Rotemberg (1987).
In comparing TS and IR models, we stress that the building blocks that are likely to
make these two approaches work are similar, even though the sources of productivity movements
are very different. In particular, we identify durable goods, elastic labor supply, specialized
labor, and imperfect credit as key assumptions needed to make these models consistent with
stylized facts. Although we occasionally criticize existing TS models, our main task is to argue
that these models have many similar implications and require similar assumptions as do business
cycle models with increasing returns.
To fix ideas, in section 2 we present a simple I-sector IR model based on Murphy,4
Shleifer andVishny (1988)anddescribeits similarities to and differences from the standard TS
model. The emphasi! on that section i! on importance of durable goods for generating large
output fluctuations without large changes in productivity. The section also shows that business
cycles almo5t haveto arisein a model with increasing returns, durable goods, and elastic labor
supply.We conclude thatthe I-sector JR model can generate the same essential predictions as the
TS model, and i! consistent with a broader range of evidence.
Although most research on real business cycles has focused on a I-sector model, one of
the crucial empirical challenges I! to explain the significant amount of comovement of labor
inputs and of outputs in different sectors.In section 3, we first document this comovement over
the business cycle. We then suggest that the TS literature has not adequately explained
comovement, even though this step is necessary to generate aggregate fluctuations from sectoral
productivity shocks. Finally, we show how two assumptions—immobility of labor across sectors
and imperfect capital markets—help generate comovement in both TS and IR models. To stress
the similarities between the two approaches, we use a TS model to make many of the arguments
we previously made in Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1988). The upshot of section 3 is that with
immobile labor and imperfect capital markets TS and IR models can be extended to many sectors.
In section 4, we deal with the crucial ingredient of both the IR and the TS models:
elastic labor supply. We discuss some plausible and implausible reasons why the assumption of
elastic labor supply might be valid and the relevance of micro-econometric evidence for this
debate.
In section 5wepresent some evidence on the behavior of relative prices over the busi-
ness cycle. We find that the relative prices of finished goods are much less procyclical than those
of raw materials and intermediate goods. Among rinished goods, durable5 appear to have
countercyclical relative prices. Finally, output prices are strongly countercyclical relative to input
prices.Our evidence for the postwar period basically replicates the findings of Mills (1936) and
Means et al. (1939) for the Great Depression, except that real wages in the postwar period have
been procyclical and in the 1930s they were countercyclical. This evidence on relative prices is
problematic for the view that recessions result from adverse shocks to production functions or5
price3 of common inputs, such as oil or steel. The evidence favors models based on increasing
returns in distribution or on countercyclical markups on finished durables.
Section 6 concludes.
2. A 1-Sector Real Business Cycle Model with Tncreasin Returns
In this section we outline a one sector general equilibrium model of the economy where
production is subject to increasing returns to scale. The model is taken from Murphy, Shleifer
and Vishny (1988), hereafter MSV88, which is both more format and contains considerably more
material. After presenting the model, we compare it to the standard TS model.
The model describes fluctuations in a single durable good industry subject to industry-
wideincreasing returns. Because the good is durable, shoit run demand for it is extremely elastic,
since consumers can easily substitute purchases over time. The industry-wide increasing returns
assumption amounts to saying that productivity is high at high industry output and low at low
industry output, and that no individual firm can by itself energize the industry and move it to
high output and low costs.
The combination of flat short run demand and downward sloping supply naturally 1ead
to instability in the system. it is efficient for this industry to produce at capacity some of the
time and to rest other times, rather than to always produce at a constant output level. More
interestingly, even though some output fluctuations are efficient, equilibrium output fluctuations
are not. Because the industry cannot coordinate the end of a slump, in equilibrium firms often
get stuck at the low output level for periods of time that are much longer than is necessary to take
advantage of increasing returns. The fact that the economy gets stuck at a low output level is the
essence of the IR theory of economic fluctuations.
A. Demand and Suoolv
We consider a model with a representative consumer maximizing the utility function
given by:6
fe(u(S(t))-L(t))dt,
where S(t) iz the stock of durable3 the consumer owns at time t,andL(t) is his labor supply. The
assumption that labor is perfectly (or at least highly) substitutable over time is important we
return to it in section 4.
The evolution of the stock of durable goods is given by
S(t)— 1(t) — SS(t),
where1(t) is output at time tand &is the depreciation rate.
The durability of the good leads to an important distinction between the long run and
the short run demand curves. The long run demand curve for the good, D(X),isgiven by.
u'(X/5) —(r + 5)p,
where p is the price of the durable in utility units or leisure units. This demand curve is
downward sloping. In the long run, at a lower price the consumer demands a higher constant
stock of durables.
In the short run, in contrast, the stock of durables is essentially fixed, since the supply
and depreciation over an instant are trivial relative to the stock. To calculate the short run
demand curve, we as3ume that consumer! take all future purchases as given. The short run
demand curve is then horizontal, at the level of prices p(S(t)) given by the present value of future
rental rates u'(S(r)
p(S(t)) — fe''u'(S(r))dr.
Atany price above p(S(t)), the consumer buys nothing at time tandconsumes leisure; at any
price below p(S(t)), his instantaneous demand is infinite. This demand curve relies on perfect
intertemporal substitutability of leisure.7
For simplicity, we consider an industry subject to Marshallian external economies.
Assume that there is a unit interval of competitive firms in this industry, each with a production
function:
(6)
wherex is firm's output, I is industry output, and 1 is the firm's labor input. We assume that
each firm faces a capacity constraint, so ic 7.Wealso assume that f(O) >0,and f'> 0.The
latter is the increasing returns assumption that makes the productivity of each firm an increasing
function of industry output.
The Marshallian externalities formulation enables us to treat firms as price takers while
incorporating increasing returns into the model. We use a competitive formulation both because it
is relatively simple and because it underscores the fact that movements in productivity are
responsible for fluctuations. Several recent papers (Hall 1986, 1988a; Cooper and John 1988;
Cooper and Haltiwanger 1988) have stressed empirically and theoretically the importance of
imperfect competition for macroeconomic fluctuations. The assumption of imperfect
competition seems to us to serve two functions. First, it can be the source of coordination
problems that lead to multiple equilibria.Second, it can be the source of countercyclical
markups that lead to procyclical behavior of real wages and therefore to procyclical labor input.
Since Marshallianexternalitiesthemselves generate coordination problems, and since we focus on
productivity movements rather than countercyclical markups as the source of real wage changes,
we do not need the assumption of imperfect competition in the exposition, although its inclusion
might make the model more realistic.




where w/p is the real wage. These conditions give us the industry supply curve, defined as the
locus of price quantity pairs that can arise as an industry equilibrium. The supply curve
subsumes the equilibrium wage, given by the current and future stocks of durables the consumer
owns that firms today take as given. At this equilibrium wage, labor supply is perfectly elastic.
Accordingly, industry supply at the real wage w/p is given by
(9) I —
providedthat firms are not at the capacity constraint.
Let X, solve
(10)
50 X, is the industry's capacity output. The goods supply curve is then given in Figure 1: it is
decreasing from p. w/f(0) at 0 output to p —w/f(X)at capacity output, and then has a vertical





The combination of this industry supply curve with horizontal short run demand is the source of
equilibrium fluctuations in this model.
How do we interpret our downward sloping industry supply curve? We stress that we
do not fiterally believe that technological externalities are an important explanation of cyclical
fluctuations. However, the Marshalilan externality formulation can be thought of as a reduced
form for some things that we do believe to be important, and discuss at some length in M5V88.
The most plausible form of industry-wide increasing returns probably has to do with "thick
markets" externalities or with the closely related economies of scale in distribution. When the
output in the industry is high, there are many customers in the market, and so the probability of a
fast match between the seller and the buyer is much higher. Because the selling costs are a9
significant component of the costs of making the final good, and because these costs plausibly fall
when the industry rather than the firm's output rises, we find specification (6) appealing. In this
respect, the work most closely related to our specification is Diamond (1982) and Howitt and
McAfee (1988).
There are several industry nructures that can be thought of in this way. For example,
our supply curve can describe an industry such as housing in which time to sale falls and
therefore productivity rises when there is a lot of construction and many consumers are in the
market. Alternatively, our supply curve might be a reduced form description of an industry in
which specialized supplies are cheaper when the industry is humming because individual suppliers
can take advantage of their increasing returns at the firm level. Our supply curve can also
describe an. industry in which there are increasing returns in retailing.
An important question is whether our downward sloping supply curve can describe an
industry in which markets are perfectly organized, but individual firms face increasing returns in
production. Ramey (1987) finds that the industry marginal cost curve for a number of
manufacturing industries is declining, suggesting that in fact one can get industry increasing
returns purely in production. Ramey also surveys a number of other empirical studies
documenting declining industry marginal cost curves. Hall (1988a,c) presents evidence for
increasing returns at the industry level, although his evidence pertains to decreasing average
rather than marginal cost. As we mentioned in the introduction, the decreasing average cost story
typically yields procyclical real wages because of countercyclical markups and not because of
procyclical productivity.It is thus a different story from the one we tell.
Despite Rainey's and others' evidence on declining industry marginal cost, there are no
good theoretical models of such industries.If an industry where individual firin3 have increasing
returns in production adjusts to declines in demand by shutting down inefficient plants, then even
if each plant operates subject to increasing returns industry returns to scale are decreasing. For
increasing returns in production at the plant or firm level to translate into industry increasing
returns, an industry must contract in a recession by keeping most plants in operation, and
reducing the output of each rather than by shutting down inefficient plants. This would be the10
case if,for example,productsofdifferentplants were geographically or otherwise highly
differentiated. Contraction of all plants would also result if different firms in the industry could
not, for competitive reasons, share the market in a way that enables a few to produce at capacity
and to take advantage of increasing returns. Such firms would rather keep their customers and
produce at a high marginal cost. However one thinks of these industries, they must have the
property that most firms and indeed most plants are marginal and so increasing returns at the
plant level translate into increasing returns at the industry level. Since our paper focuses on the
structureofincreasing returns models, we treat (6) as a primitive assumption and do not pursue a
specific model of the market structure.
B. Equilibria
An equilibrium in this model is a path of output X(t), durable stock S(t), wage w(t)and
price p(t) such that all markets clear. Note that as long as (5)holds,the consumer is on his labor
supply curve.
To make the model interesting, we assume that the long run demand curve D(X)cuts
the downward sloping segment of the supply curve.If D(X)cutsthe supply curve at capacity, the
equilibrium is the trivial outcome in which all firms produce at capacity all the time. In MSV88
we show that if building capacity is sufficiently cheap relative to the cost saving from operating
at a higher output, firms will always build enough capacity so that long run demand curve cuts
the downward sloping segment of the supply curve.
This model has a variety of cyclical equilibria, which take the following form. Over
some period of time, the economy produces at capacity A',,, the stock of durables grows, and the
rental rate on durable falls. During initial stages of this period, people's willingness to work for
goods declines since their consumption rises, and so the price of goods falls while real wages rise.
Toward the end of the high production period, the price of goods actually rises in the anticipation
of lean times and high rental rates in the future. Eventually the boom ends, and the economy
switches to 0 output, again maintained over some period of time. During this period, the stock of
























willingness of people to work for goods rises, and at least at the initial stages of the recession
prices rise and real wages fall. Toward the end of the recession, we again get the effect that
prices fall because people know that good times axe coming and with them low rental rates.
Th13 business cycle can be easily thought of in terms of figure 2.During the boom, the
economy operates on the vertical segment of the supply curve. As the boom continues, the
demand curve essentially slides down the vertical segment of the supply curve, because the will-
ingness to work dimini3hes (again, the demand curve moves up shortly before the boom ends). At
some point, the economy switches to 0 output, and at the initial stages of the boom the demand
curve is moving up. Eventually, the economy goes back to the high production level.Figure 3
describes the behavior of the capital stock, prices, and real wages over the business cycle.
The period of these cycles can be very short, where the economy "chatters" between
high and low output, or much longer. In the longer cycles, the sector gets stuck at a high or low
output level because a coordinated change in output by many firms is required to change each
firm's productivity and prices. The Manhallian externality in the production function is the
source of this coordination failure. The coordination failure is crucial to the model, since without
it the economy would fluctuate at a very high frequency, and there would be no hope of
explaining low frequency business cycle fluctuations. Although many cycles are sustainable,
constant output is not sustainable a an equilibrium, since in this case any firm raising its output
would bring other firms to do likewi3e and to destroy the equilibrium.
An interesting property of this model is that it has the cycle of longest possible
duration, for reasons detailed by MitcheU (1927). In thi3 cycle, the price of durables reaches its
minimum and maxunum sustainable value& The longest cycle has the property that both the
recession and the boom last as long a they possibly can in a cyclical equilibrium. If the boom
were to last any longer, the rental rates would get to be so low that at some point prior to the end
of the boom the price of durables would have to fall below production costeven when the sector
is operating at maximum efficiency. Because this cannot happen in equilibrium, there isa natural
end to the boom, where people get so satiated with durables that they would rather take leisure
than work even at a high productivity. In terms of Figure 2, the longest boom can be thought of12
as the demand curve falling off the cliff at XH.Similarly,if the recession were to last any longer,
at some point prior to its end the prices of durables would get so high that even onefirm
operatingalone at a tow productivity can make money by producing. This of course cannot
happen in equilibrium. This natural end to the recession means that people eventually want goods
so much that they are willing to work at low productivity to get goods rather than consume
leisure. The longest cycle is a form of long run stability in this economy, which arises because
the long run demand curve for goods is steeper than the long run supply curve.
The welfare properties of the equilibria in this model can be easily summarized. First,
at least same output fluctuations are efficient.It is efficient for this sector to take advantage of
increasing returns and to produce some of the time and rest the remainder of the time. Second,
most equilibrium fluctuations are not efficient. This inefficiency is reflected in the fact that the
period of the cycle is too long, which leads to excessive variability of consumption. The
inefficiency is also reflected in the fact that, for a cycle of a fixed period, recessions last too long
relative to booms, leading to too low an average level of consumption.The main reason for the
latter inefficiency is the Marshallian exteriality and the resulting coordination problem, that
prevents firms from spending more time operating at capacity. The model shows that even in the
world where fluctuations of output are efficient, equilibrium business cycles are unlikely to be so.
C. A Comoarspn of the rR Model with the TS model
Similarities
There are a significant number of similarities between the IR model described above
and the TS model. Most obviously, fluctuations in both models are driven by productivity
movements. In the TS model, such movements result from exogenous technological shocks. In
the IR model, they result from endogenous movements along the increasing returns production
function. The consequence of either assumption, however, is that business cycles are associated
with movements in true, rather than just measured, productivity.
A key feature of our model is durability of the good, that leads to extremely elastic
short run demand and instability. As a result, the model generates large output fluctuations even13
with small increasing returns. TS models have not stressed durable consumption goods, although
they do emphasize the durable nature of capital. The large responsiveness of investment to small
changes in productivity is an important element of the Kydland/Prescott and Prescott modelsas
well.
An appealing feature of our model, that can be easily worked into a TS modet, is the
natural limit on the length of booms and recessions. Proponents of the TS view rarely talk about
business cycles per Se, and so this issue of mean reversion does not arise. However, the effectwe
are talking about would appear in a TS model also. Even if the economy is subjected to a
sequence of fairly persistent adverse technology shocks, eventually it would pay to work and to
produce even if opportunities are poor, provided that people are hungry enough for goods. Such
long run stability would thus appear in a TS model as well.
Differences
Here we note four differences between 1-sector IR and TS models, other than thesource of
productivity movements. First, the R model is an endogenous business cycle model, and theTS
model is an exogenousshocksmodel. To the extent that we have trouble identifying technology
shocks, particularly the bad ones that cause recessions, an endogenous business cycle modelseems
more attractive. Moreover, we find the importance of self-fulfilling expectations an attractive
feature of the IR models.
Second, most technology shocks are likely to be persistent, whereas periods ofproduc-
tion at high capacity in IR models are temporary. Because Prescott (1986)assumes highly
persistent shocks, the ability of agents to engage in intertemporal substitution islimited. Hence,
intertemporal substitution must be very high to rationalize the observedmovements as an
equilibrium response to permanent shocks. In contrast, since inour endogenous model good times
are very temporary, we need much less intertemporal substitution to induce agents to respondto
periods of high productivity with increased labor supply. Since intertemporalsubstitutability
needed to calibrate TS models is extremely large, the fact that JR models need much less ofsuch
substitutability is attractive.14
Third, IR and TS models have different implicationsabout the response of labor
productivity to demand shocb. Kydland/Prescottpredict that, holding technology constant, labor
productivity should fall and certainly not rise in responseto a demand shock because of
diminishing returns. In contrast, our modelpredicts that a demand shock could switch the
economy to a high output level, and soraise productivity because of increasing returns.
Con3istent with the last prediction, Hall (198k), usinginstruments for demand
disturbances, finds that demand shocks positivelyaffect the Solow residual. The appropriateness
of Hall's instruments, which include mostnotably the price of oil, has been questioned. His
results can also be explained by unobservedprocyclical work effort.If Hall's results stand up to
scrutiny, however, they provide strong evidenceagainst TS models. In an observation similar to
Hall's, Mankiw (1989) points out that measuredlabor productivity rose in World War II, at the
time of a sharp increase in the government'spurchases of durables. One explanation of Mankiw's
result is increasing returns, although there areothers, including the increased war effort.
A fmat distinction between the simple ZRand the simple TS models is in the treatment
of welfare consequences of fluctuation3. OurJR model suggests that the efficiency cost of most
business cycles is small, since consumption ofdurables varies a lot less than do purchases.
Empirically, we may not be too far from Prescott's(1986) conclusion that business cycles are
efficient. Nonetheless, it seems obvious that neitherTS nor IR models have yet dealt with
important costs of business fluctuations, such asunequal distribution of the burden of the
recessions or their excessive duration because of morefundanenta1 problems, such as financial
collapse. It is fair to say that neither approach hasseriously dealt with policy.
We can summarize this section by stressing that bothmodels are similar in that
fluctuations are driven by movements in labor productivity.Both models are significantly more
plausible when they stress durability of goods as a wayto generate large output responses to small
productivity changes. The increasing returns model hasthe additional advantage of being
supported by independent evidence (Ramey 1987,Hall 1988a,c). In the next few sections, we
describe in more detail some of the ways to augmentboth the standard TS model and our IR
model to make them match the evidence better.15
3. Comovenient of Qutnuts and Labor Inputs Between Sectors
A. The Evidence and the Problem
The previous section has presented a I -sector JR model of the business cycle and
compared it to a I-sector TS model. One sector models do not, however, address the question of
comovement of outputs and labor inputs across sectors during the business cycle. In this section,
we first discuss the fact that such comovement is extremely pronounced, and is clearly one of the
crucial stylized facts that a business cycle model should explain. We then suggest that the Prescott
(1986) and Long/Plosser (1983) models do not adequately explain why outputs and labor inputs in
different sectors move together. Finally, we present an alternative approach to comovement,
based on immobile (specialized) labor and imperfect credit.
Table 1 presents the evidence on annual correlation of growth rates of different sectors
of the economy during 1947-87. Panel A focuses on annual growth rates of real output, and
panel B presents data on annual growth rates of employment.- Table 1also includes correlations
with changes in detrended employment rate—described in more detail in Section 5—which is our
preferred business cycle indicator.
Table I shows extremely high correlations of output growth across sectors, as well as
high correlations of sectoral growth rates with the business cycle indicator. Most strikingly, the
correlation of growth rate of durables with the growth rate of GDP is .95, and with the change in
the detrended employment rate it is .92. Growth rates of oufput in construction, nondurables,
and even trade are also extremely highly correlated with the GDP growth rate, ihe cyclical indi-
cator, and each other. Mining comoves somewhat less, in part because there is a sharp change in
the trend growth rate of mining over this period. Even government and finance seem to move in
step with other sectors. In fact, there is not a single negative coefficient in panel A of table 1.It
is very much the case in these data that outputs in broadly defined sectors move together and
procyclically.
A similar picture emerges for labor inputs in panel B of table 1. Growth rates of labor
inputs are highly correlated across sectors, and with the cyclical indicator. Durables again lead





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































correlation with the changes in the cyclical variable. There are a few negative correlations of
employment growth rates, such as between government and trade and government and services,
but by and large employment growth rates behave like output growth rates.In fact, the extent of
comovement in labor inputs between durable, nondurables, construction, and trade is quite
remarkable—and those are the sectori across which labor is potentially mobile.
One question table 1 does not address is whether comovement between sectori is just a
reflection of trend growth rates in the economy, or whether it reflects shorter-run cyclical
fluctuation of sectorl. To address this issue, table 2 presents partial correlations of output and
employment growth rates controlling for business cycle movements. In these partial correlations,
the business cycle control is our detrended employment growth rate. Large residual correlations
would be evidence of strong noncyclical comovement, which can just reflect the growth rate of
the economy.
The partial correlation coefficients in table 2 are obviously much smaller than those in
table I, and many of them are negative. For exmpIe, the residual correlation of growth rates of
durables and nondurable is .50, compared to the correlation of .91 in table I •andthe residual
correlation of durables and construction is .26 compared to the correlation of .69 in table I.
Similarly, the residual correlation of growth rates of durable and nondurable employment is .53,
compared to the raw correlation of .59, and the residual correlation of growth rates of
employment in durables and construction is -.20, compared to the raw correlation of .62.In fact,
the average difference between the total correlation of sectoral output growth rates with GDP
growth and the residual correlation of these two variables is .28.Similarly, the average difference
between the total correlation of sectoral employment growth rates with GDP growth rate and the
residual correlation is .24. These results demotutrate quite convincingly that cyclical comovement
of growth rates of output and employment across sectori qualifies as a bona fide stylized fact of
business cycle analysis.
Theoretically, generating such strong positive comovements of outputs and labor inputs
from sectoral productivity changes is not easy. To see the problem, suppose that sector A is













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Either way, productivity and wages in sector A are high, and so, with a positively sloped labor
supply curve, labor input in sector A rises.If other sectors do not also experience a productivity
improvement, and if the output of sector A is not complementary in consumption or production
with the outputs of these other sectoi, labor should move out of these sectors and into sector A,
resulting in a negative comovement of labor inputs across sectors. Unless the good productivity
shock is pervasive, so that the only sector that shrinks is leisure, this model has trouble explaining
comovement of labor inputs.
This problem is troubling for both Prescott's (1986) and Long and Plosser's (1983)
approaches. As has been pointed out independently by Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1988),
Prescott's (1986) model predicts a negative comovement of labor inputs between consumption and
investment sectors.Prescott does not distinguish between consumption and investment sectors,
but we in fact can think of the two sectors as separate but having identical production functions.
Prescott calibrates his model by noting that, in the long run, labor input does not rise and maybe
even declines with increases in productivity. This means that, within the consumption sector, the
income effect is at least as strong as the substitution effect. The implication of this assumption is
that employment in the consumption sector does not rise, and possibly shrinks, in response to a
good productivity shock to that sector. From the point of view of employment in the
consumption sector, we can therefore think of shocks in this model as being only to the
investment good sector.
Suppose that there is a good productivity shock to the investment sector.In response to
this attractive temporary opportunity, labor input in the investment sector rises, raising the
marginal utility of leisure. Calibration says that holding the labor input in the investment sector
constant, labor input in the consumption sector is independent of productivity in the consumption
sector. Hence, since labor input in the investment sector rises, we should get a fall in the labor
input in the consumption sector. The Prescott (1986) model thus predicts, counterfactually,
countercyclical labor input in the consumption sector. This result is much more general than
Prescott's (1986) specific model; details are available from us upon request.
A similar problem would arise in Long and Plosser's model, except they assume unit18
elastic demand for leisure. As a result of this assumption, labor inputs do not change over the
cycle in their model: their model generates comovement in outputs at constant labor inputs.If LP
instead assumed a more conventional positively sloped labor supply, they would get a negative
comovementof labor inputs between sectors at the time productivity shocks hit. An increase in
productivity in one sector raises the real wage and draws labor into that sector Out of other sectors
as well as Out of leisure. Long and Plosser can still get a positive comovement of final outputs by
the time shocks propagate through the input-output matrix. As we show in section 5,however,
this story is inconsistent with relative price evidence.
In the rest of this section, we offer a solution to this problem, based on the idea that,
first, labor is specialized and immobile between sectors, and, second, there are borrowing
constraints.In practical terms, immobile labor means that people have a strong comparative
advantage at working in only one, or a few, sectors, and therefore cannot easily move into
whatever sector is productive at the moment. This assumption is perfectly consistent with large
gross labor flows in the economy, and with a high level of mobility of some segments of the labor
force.It only says that, for many workers, it is better to work in their own sector and to
exchange the output for other goods than always to move into the most productive sector,
Immobile labor creates a need for people to trade the goods they produce, rather than working in
each sector to produce the good for their own consumption.
This need to trade when labor is immobile is an important component of the story
explaining comovement. Consider first the case of mobile labor. When sector A is productive,
and labor is mobile, it pays all workers to come work in sector A to buy sector A's good, which is
now particularly cheap. Unless some other goods are complements to A—which we assume they
are not—the tradeoff between leisure and work in other sectors has not changed. In this case,
workers should both consume less leisure and work less in other sectors.
Suppose, in contrast, that outside workers are not trained to work in sector A, so that
the increase in sector A's labor input comes entirely from the reduction in leisure of it own
workers. Good A is still cheap, and so outside workers want to spend more on it if demand for A
is elastic. To do that, they must work more in their own sectors, and then spend more on good A.19
This leads to increased labor input in other sectors, and a positive comovement of labor inputs
across sectoll. Alternatively, workeii from outside sector A can borrow and buy more of good A
now, working slightly more today and in all the future periods to repay their debts.If workers
can ea3ily borrow, there would be some but not much comovement. Generating significant
comovement between sectors requires both immobile labor and restricted borrowing opportunities.
In the next subsection, we present the immobile labor argument formally using a I-
period TS model. Subsection C summarizes the arguments in MSY88 that use these ideas in an IR
model. Our theory of comovement illustrates the importance of trade, as opposed to Robinson
Crusoe, for understanding fluctuations. We show at the end of this section that several earlier
papers have made assumptions amounting essentially to immobile labor.
B. A Formal TS model
This section presents a one-period competitive RBC model with technological shocks.
There is a unit interval of small sectors, each producing its own good, s. There is also a unit
measure of consumeil. The utility function of each consumer is given by
1C(s) L8 f9d5$.
where c(s) is consumption of good s and L is labor. We assume that $> I and 6< 1.For
consistency of the model, we also assume that $- 92> 0.In this model, the case of 6> 1
corresponds to elastic demand for goods and upward sloping labor supply. The substitution effect
in the demand for goods is stronger than the income effect. In contrast, when 6 <0,the income
effect is stronger, the demand for goods is inelastic, and labor supply is backward bending.
Naturally, the case of 9 >0is more plausible for durable. Also note that $— Icorresponds to no
diminishing marginal utility of leisure and —0to the Long/Plosser case of unit elastic demand
for goods and therefore for leisure.20
The production function of good s is given by
(13) y(s)
where -i(s) is technological shock and L(s) is labor input in sector s.Each good is produced
competitively in its own sector.
Consider first this model with mobile labor, so there is actually a representative
consumer we can talk about. This consumer's budget constraint is given by
(14) 5c(s)p(s)ds—Lw.
Market clearing requires that c(s) —y(s)for all s, and competition says that y(s)p(s)w. We can
let the wage be numeraire: w —1.
This model can be solved for consumption of each good s and labor input in each





Severalobservations can be made about these solutions.
First, consumption of good s always increases in y(s). This is because a good productivity
shock always reduces the relative price of good s, and since s is normal, its consumption rises.
Second, when 9> 0, labor input in sector s rises with the technology shock, and when 9 <0,labor
input declines with the shock. The former case corresponds to the elastic demand for good s, so
when the price of good s falls, demand for s rises more than the increase in output due to the
productivity increase, and so employment rises. Conversely, when 9 <0,the demand for good s
is inelastic, and so a rise in productivity leads to a less than proportional increase in the quantity21
consumed, and so a reduction in the labor input. The case of >0corresponds to durable goods,
and so both labor ad output should probably rise when a sector experiences a positive
productivity shock.
More interesting results concern comovement of outputs and labor inputs across sectors.
When $— 1,(15) and (16) show that all sectors move by themselve!, without any influence from
other sectors, as one would expect in the case of separability of goods and no increasing disutility
of work.The same result obtains in the Long/Plosser case of —0,where labor inputs in
different sectors are fixed, and outputs move proportionately with productivity because of unit
elastic demand.Except for these two cases, however, labor always negatively comoves between
sectors. When >0,a good productivity shock in sector s'raisesdemand for labor in s', and so,
since the tradeoff between employment in sector $andleisure has not changed, there will be a
reduction both in leisure and in employment in s.When<0,a good productivity shock to s'
reduceslabor input in s'becauseof inelastic demand for this good, and so labor moves both into
leisure ad into sector s.Thiscase, of course, is blatantly inconsistent with the evidence. In
either case, labor inputs in sandin s'movein opposite directions, contrary to what happens over
a business cycle.
Furthermore, output negatively comoves in the plausible case of >0,and positively
comove! with<0.When >0,a good shock in s'raisesemployment and output in s'butcuts
employment in s,aswe mentioned earlier. Because productivity in sector $isunchanged, output
of good $mustalso fall. Output in sands'thusmove in opposite directions. When<0,a good
shock in s' raises output but reduces employment in s'.Becauselabor moves into sector s,both
employment and output in sector $rise.This leads to comovement of outputs. In the case of
mobile labor, we thu3 get two unrealistic results: employment comove negatively, and output
comoves negatively in the plausible case of upward sloping labor supply. Long and Plosser do not
get the latter result because, in their model, shocks are to common intermediate inputs and so are
correlated.
Consider next the more interesting case of immobile labor, where a worker can only
work in one sector or consume leisure. We assume the same preferences as before, and the same22
number of workers per sector. Let c(s,s')beconsumption of good sbya worker in sector s'.The
budget constraint of worker s'nowtakes the forrn
(17) f c(s,s')p(s)ds— L(s')w(s')
for all s'.Competitionnow does not restrict wages to be the same in all sectors:
(18) (s)p(s)— n(s)
forall s.Finally, market clearing takes the form
(19) f c(s,s')ds'— 'y(s)L(s)
for all s.For our purposes, we do not need to choose a numeraire.
A considerable amount of grinding leads to the following closed form solution to this model:





(23) L(s') —-1(s')9f 7(s*)ds*
Using (22)-(23), we can ask the same questions as we did with mobile labor.
Similarly to the case with mobile labor, consumption of good s by a worker in sector s'
increases both in the shock to sector s and in the shock to sector s'.But there are some crucial
differences. First, due to the symmetry assumption, labor input in sector s always rises with
productivity in that sector, whether or not 9 is positive. When 9 >0,demand for good s is elastic.23
At the same labor input as before the shock, the price of good sdeclinesless than productivity
rises, so that the real wage in sector srises.Since labor supply is upward sloping for>0,labor
input rises in response to the increase in the real wage. In contrast, when<0,demand for good
sisinelastic. When -'(s)rises,p(s)fallsmore than the productivity increase, and so the real wage
in sector sfalls.But labor supply slopes down for 8< 0,and so labor input rises in response to
the fall in the real wage. Independent of the value of 9, labor input in sector salwaysmoves in
the same direction as productivity in that sector.
The most interesting results again concern comovement of labor inputs and of
consumption. In this model, we get comovement of labor inputs as long as >0.When
productivity y(s')insector s'rises,p(s')falls,which raises the real wages of workers in all other
sectors. With>0,labor supply in these sectors slopes up and so workers there all work more.
Conversely, with 9 <0,labor supply slopes down and labor input in sector sfallsin response to a
rise in y(s').Aslong as workers want to work more when their real wage rises, they respond to a
lower price in another sector by producing more of their own good, and trading it for the
productive sector's output.
Comovement of consumption, like comovement of labor, depends on the sign of .
Whensector sexperiencesa good productivity shock, p(s)fallsand real wages in all sectors rise.
When >0,workers in all sectors want to work more and to buy more of all goods, so
consumption of all goods rises.In co1trast, when<0,the response to a rise in real wages from
a fall in p(s)isto work less, so hours and consumption of all goods other than good sfall.
Consumption of different goods comoves, therefore, as long as labor supply slopes up.
The results for mobile and immobile labor are very different. With mobile labor,
employment always comoves negatively across sectors, and consumption comoves only if<0.
With immobile labor, employment and consumption both comove for 9 >0and not otherwise.
The reason for the difference is that with mobile labor, one can get more of another good by
working in the sector it is produced, whereas with immobile labor one has to work in one's own
sector and trade. For durables, the case of elastic demand (and therefore positively sloped labor
supply) is the empirically correct one. Since in this case the model clearly generates empirically24
correct predictions about comovement of labor inputs and consumption over the business cycle,
the case for assuming specialization and immobile iabor seems to be compelling.
Because our model assumes identical demand elasticities for different goods, it does not
deal with Prescott's case. We have looked at a model where 8— 0for one good, and 8>0for
another. In such a model, one indeed gets a negative comovement of labor inputs with mobile
labor, and a positive comovement with immobile labor.
So far we have presented a one period model, and have not addressed the issue of
credit.If we think of some of the goods in our model as future consumption goods, the credit
point is apparent. Even if labor is immobile, an increase in productivity and the resulting decline
in the price of good s are likely to lead to only a small increase in today's labor input in other
sectoti. Instead of working much harder today, a worker in a sector s'wouldborrow to take
advantage of the low price of good s,andrepay the loan by raising his labor supply today and in
all the future periods by a small amount. To generate a significant amount of comovement
between sector3, both immobile labor and imperfect credit are required.
The role we have assigned to imperfect credit here is different from—and
complementary to—that in other recent models (Bernanke and Gertler 1989, Greenwald and
Stiglitz 1987). In those models, a bad shock reduces the internal availability of funds to a firm,
which then has to reduce its investment because of the credit constraint, The reduction in
investment in turn leads to lower output and therefore a persistently lower availability of funds in
the future. Importantly, this is basically a 1-sector (or one-firm) story of the role of credit. In
contrast, here and in MSV88 credit serves to facilitate intertemporal trade between sectors. When
credit markets are imperfect, such trade is less attractive, leading agents in different sectors of
the economy to synchronize their production periods so they can trade instantaneously and
economize on credit. In this sense, imperfect credit in our model serves to concentrate the effects
of shock at a point in time rather than to spread them over time. We believe that both
consequences of imperfect credit are important in practice.In fact, it may be possible to combine
the Greenwald-Stiglitz—Bernanke-Gertler view of countercyclical costs of credit with some
features of our model, such as immobile labor, durables and elastic labor supply, to generate self-25
fulfillingfluctuations even in the absence of increasing returns at the sectoral level.
C. Comovement in a Model with Increasing Returns
So far, we have considered the comovement issue in a TS model, where it is simpler to
see. Identical arguments apply alzo in a variant of an lB. model of Section 2, and are developed in
MSV88. The question in the IR model is: why wouldn't different sectors of the economy cycle
out of synch with each other, especially if there is an aggregate resource constraint?If they do
cycle out of synch, aggregate output would be smooth, and we would not observe aggregate
fluctuations.
In MSV88, we show that aggregate fluctuations obtain when labor is immobile and
borrowing is constrained. In this case, when a sector is productive and its output is cheap, the
only way workers in other sectors can take advantage of low prices is by working themselves and
trading their output for the productive sector's output. ra equilibrium, all sectors fluctuate
together. As in a TS model, aggregate fluctuations obtain with immobile labor and restricted
borrowing in an IR model.
The notion of immobile labor has appeared in a number of recent models in somewhat
different ways. Diamond (1982), Weitzman (1982) and Roberts (1987) assume either that workers
are specialists in production and generalists in consumption, or that they cannot consume the good
that they produce. The power of this assumption is always to make trade necessary for
consunption and to preclude the possibility that people, Robinson Crusoe like, simply toil to
produce their own consumption good. The point that MSV88 and the current paper emphasize is
that these assumptions can be used to explain the observed comovement of outputs and of labor
inputs across sectors in a wide range of models. Specialization does not just generate
"Keynesian" results, but also yields empirically correct predictions about comovement—even ina
TS model.There is nothing intrinsically Keynesian about specialization.'
'Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) assume immobile labor and imperfect credit to generatea role
for money as a store of value. They do not consider the role of immobile labor in generating
comovement of outputs and of labor inputs across sectors.26
4. E1astic Labor Suoolv
A. The need for assuming elastic labor supp'y
Recent empirical research (Bils 1985, Kydland and Prescott 1987, Solon and Barsky
1988) finds that real wages move procyclically over the business cycle, but only mildly so. At the
same time, to generate large labor supply movements from smallchanges in real wages, one needs
to assume that the intertemporal or lifetime elasticity of labor supply is much higher. For
example, Prescott (986) takes this elasticity to be 2, and stilt predicts too low fluctuations in
houii.
Even if one believes that real wages are installment payments that do not reflect
underlying productivity, and do not really serve to allocate labor over the business cycle, one still
needs fairly elastic labor supply. The effects of both technology shocks and increasing returns
over the business cycle are probably small quantitatively. To get large efficient movements in the
labor input in response to such small changes in technology requires easy substitutability of labor
over tinie. That i, for workers and firms to agree to a contract that requires large changes in
their labor input in response to small changes in productive opportunities, leisure must be easily
substitutable over time. Otherwise, one needs to explain why the worker and the firm do not
eliminate inefficient fluctuations in hours that are not justified by fluctuations in productivity.
We have pointed out earlier that TS models with reasonably persistent technology
shocks require a greater labor supply elasticity than do IR models to generate the same
fluctuations. This is because in an IR model, periods of high productivity are by definition
temporary, since it is not an equilibrium to produce high output all the time. In contrast, in a TS
model driven by reasonably permanent shocks, good opportunities to work are equally permanent,
and so the instantaneous labor supply response to a shock is small. Because productivity changes
are less permanent in an IR model, the labor supply elasticity required by such a model is smaller.
At the same time, whereas a TS model depends on elastic labor supply only
quantitatively, an IR model fails to generate fluctuations altogether if labor supply is sufficiently
inelastic. In a TS model, less elastic labor supply dampens the effects of technological shocks on
output, and consequently reduces output volatility. In our model, in contrast, sufficiently27
inelastic labor supply can eliminate the possibility of fluctuations altogether. The reason is that
when labor supply is sufficiently inelastic, increases in industry output raise costs even if labor
productivity rises, and so make the supply curve slope up rather than down. If the supply curve
slopes up, the unique stable equilibrium is constant output. In this way, inelastic labor supply
completely eliminates the possibility that our model can explain business cycle fluctuations.
As this subsection suggestz, even though TS and IR models rely in different ways on
the elastic labor supply assumption, they both rely on it strongly. More generally, any model that
fits the observed fluctuations of labor input must rely on this assumption. For example, it is
needed for countercyclical markup models, since the decline in markups must more than
compensate for the rise in costs in a boom. Keynesian rigid wage models also rely on elastic labor
supply to the extent that the cost of setting wages flexibly must be large to explain the costly
fluctuations in hours. Below we offer a few comments on plausibility of elastic labor supply.
B. The plausibility of elastic labor supply
Although the macroeconomic models described above require an elasticity of labor
supply of at least 1 or 2, the elasticity estimated from micro data is extremely low, perhaps
around .3. The reason for this low estimate is that wages and hours for a given individual are
both highly variable, and are basically uncorrelated. Put differently, the coefficient of the
regression of the change in hours on the change in wages, just as that of the regression of the
change in wages on the change in hours, is close to 0. The fact that there are many reasons why
measured hours and wages change, unrelated to the labor supply elasticity, is undoubtedly
responsible for the low estimate of this elasticity in micro data. This observation has led a
number of researchers to try to reconcile the low labor supply elasticity obtained from micro
studies with a high elasticity needed to explain the macro evidence.
One recent approach, begun by Rogerson (1988), starts with the observation that there
may be important non-convexities in the labor supply decision, such as transportation costs. This
model then says that people take leisure in the recession because it is not efficient for everyone to
incur these fixed costs of going to work when productivity is low.28
We have two reservations about this approach. Fijrst, it relies on the assumption that all
individuals are identical. If there is heterogeneity of individuals' cost of going to work, then
changes in the wage would get a few marginal people to discretely change their labor supply
decision, but would not affect hours for inframarginal workers.It is by no means clear that the
resulting aggregate labor supply curve is more elastic than it is when fixed costs are absent. For a
similar reason, the fact that the decision to eat Chinese food on a particular day is discrete does
not mean that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for Chinese food is infinite. Second,
fixed costs of going to work should equally affect both the micro and macro estimates of labor
supply elasticity.It is not correct to say that micro evidence yields true preference parameters,
since micro estimates are also affected by fixed costs. This approach cannot then explain the
inconsistency between micro and macro evidence. Although non-convexities might be part of the
explanation of elastic labor supply, they do not reconcile micro and macro evidence.
There seem to be some more plausible ways to explain why hours change a lot over the
business cycle when wages change only a little. One obvious possibility in the later period is
unemployment insurance with high replacement rates and imperfect experience rating, which
should significantly raise the effective elasticity of labor supply. The second possibility is that
people with a high intertemporal elasticity of substitution should sort themselves into cyclically
sensitive industries. That is, people who like to work hard some of the time and rest other times
have a strong comparative advantage at working in durable sectors, whee employment volatility
is expected. Third, the reason that hours respond strongly to small changes in wages may e that
wages are simply installment payments in a long-term relationship and do not serve to allocate
labor over the short run. Finally, it may be the case that the employer gets to choose employment
at some fixed wage and so effectively faces an elastic labor supply even though leisure is not
easily substitutable over time. On the surface, such a rigid Keynesian wage model looks very
similarto a model with perfectly elastic labor supply (Hall, 1988b) except with distinctly different
welfare implications.
To summarize, market clearing models of economic fluctuations require an
intertemporal labor supply elasticity of at least 1 or 2, but micro estimates are much smaller.29
However, micro evidence is not informative on the interternporal elasticity of labor supply
because it is hard to identify temporary wage changes at the individual level. Trying to reconcile
micro and macro evidence may not, therefore, be necessary. A more fruitful approach might be
to understand why the true elasticity is high or, alternatively, why wages are rigid.
5. The Behavior of Relative Prices
A. Overview
In this section, we present evidence on the behavior of relative prices of different
commodity groups over the business cycle. We then interpret this evidence in light of IR, TS as
well as countercyclical markup modeLs of economic fluctuations.
IR and TS models make very strong predictions about the behavior of relative prices.
Both modeLs say that goods produced with low productivity are expensive relative to goods
produced with high productivity. Since low productivity is associated with recessions, the models
say that in the recession the relative price of goods experiencing a productivity decline should
rise.This implication leads to a natural question: what are the goods that become relatively more
expensive in the recession? By isolating these goods, we can find the nexus of technology shocks
or increasing returns.
We consider several commodity groups and ask three questions: (1) What is the cyclical
behavior of the prices of finished goods, intermediate goods and raw materials relative to the
ON? deflator and to the private sector wage?(2) What is the difference in the cyclical behavior
of the prices of durable and nondurable goods relative to the GNP deflator and to the private
sector wage? (3) How do the relative prices of outputs and inputs move over the cycle?
Answers to these questions can give us some information about then nexus of increasing returns,
technology shocks, and countercyclical markups.
B. The Evidence
This section presents the evidence on the cyclical behavior of relative prices.All the
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Panel A: Broad Grouos by State of Processing
Finished goods .79 4.54
(.92) (3.20)
Consumer durables -.77 .78
(—1.00) (.61)
Consumer nondurables .37 7.38
(.23) (2.76)
Capital equipment -.81 4.37
(—1.00) (3.26)































Note.——t—statistics in parentheses.Table 4
Cyclical Behavior of Prices Relative




Panel A: Broad Grouos by State of Processing
Finished goods .29 6.35
(.30) (3.98)
Consumer durables -1.27 2.59
(-1.72) (2.12)
Consumer nondurables -.13 9.19
(-.08) (3.29)
Capital equipment -1.31 6.18
(—1.65) (4.69)
Total intermediate 2.19 10.68
(1.63) (4.80)
Manufacturing materials 2.82 12.28
(2.08) (5.47)



























Note.——t—statistics in parentheses.Table 5
Cyclical Behavior of Relative Prices
Cyclical 1974-1975
Variable tndicatpr Dummy
Panel A: Broad Groups by Stage of Processing
Finished goods/Total intermediate -1.90 -4.33
(-2.96) (-4.07)
Finished goods/Fuels -.53 -16.85
(-.17) (-3.25)
Finished goods/Crude materials -9.12 -.052
(-2.61) (-.009)
Consumer durables/Total intermediate -3.46 -8.09
(-2.77) (-3.91)
Consumer durables/Manufacturing materials -4.09 -9.69
(-3.32) (-4.74)
Consumer nondurables/Total intermediate -2.32 -1.49
(-2.57) (-.995)
Consumer nondurables/Manufacturing materials -2.96 -3.09
(—2.57) (—1.62)
Capital equipment/Total intermediate -3.50 -4.50
(-2.72) (-2.11)
Capital equipment/Manufacturing materials -4.13 -6.10
(-3.24) (—2.89)
Total intermediate/Crude materials —7.22 4.28
(-2.37) (.850)
Manufacturing materials/Crude materials -6.59 5.88
(—2.08) (1.12)
Construction materials/Crude materials -6.86 1.10
(—1.87) (.181)
Panel B: Broad Grouns and Commodities
Total intermediate/Metals -.96 -.83
(-.92) (-.48)
Manufacturing materials/Metals -.33 .77
(—.37) (.52)
Construction materials/Metals -.60 -4.01
(-.58) (-2.33)
Construction materials/Lumber -7.53 9.38
(-3.46) (2.61)Table 5 (cont'd)
Cyclical 1974-1975
Variable Indicator Dummy
Vehicles/Manufacturing materials —5.40 -10.36
(-3.14) (-3.63)
Household durables/Manufacturing materials —3.52 -8.39
(—3.26) (—4.68)






Household durables/Metals -3.85 -7.62
(—2.92) (-3.49)
Capital equipment/Metals -4.46 -533
(-3.27) (-2.36)
Household durables/Lumber -10.78 5.77
(—4.01) (1.30)
Note.-—:—statistics in parentheses.30
President. Our cyclical indicator is constructed from the civilian unemployment rate. To make
the regression coefficients interpretable, we rescale this variable before using it in the regression.
First, we pass a spline in time through the unemployment rate starting in 1965 to control for
changes in the natural rate of unemp'oyment, and then take the residuals. Second, we first
difference the resulting series and take the negativeofso obtained changes. This gives us a
procyclical measure, eQual to detrended changes in the employment rate.In each business cycle,
we define a boom as the year of the fastest growth rate of (detrended) employment, and a
recession as the year of the smallest growth rate of (detrended) employment. Finally, we scale
these detrended growth rates of employment so that the average over all cycles of the difference
of growth rates of employment between boom and recession is equal to .01. That is, in an average
cycle, our detrended and normalized employment grows 1% faster in the year defined as boom
than in the year defined as a recession. This cyclical indicator is presented in Figure 4, where
vertical lines denote recessions. Importantly, the peaks and troughs of this indicator coincide with
peaks and troughs in the growth rate of output.
In addition to using the Normalized Detrended Growth Rate of Employment in the
analysis, we also use a dummy equal to1 in 1974 and 1975, and 0 in all the other years. We do so
because the 1974-75 recession has been accompanied by a large and very unusual change in
relative prices.In particular, the relative price of oil and derivative products has increased
significantly. The 1980 recession also exhibits this pattern of relative prices, but it is not as
pronounced. Because the 1974-75 recession looks so different from all the others but one, we did
not want to contaminate our inference by this episode. All the regressions we run take the form
Change in relative price —A+Bx (Cyclical Indicator) +Cx (1974—1975 dummy).
Tables 3—5 present the results. Table 3 presents the evidence on prices relative to the
GNP deflator. Table 4 presents the results on prices relative to the average private sector hourly
earnings. Table S presents the evidence on relative prices.In all tables, panel A deals with broad
groups of goods by stage of processing, and panel B deals with individual commodities. Based on
the scaling of the cyclical indicator, all the coefficients in the tables are easy to interpret. For31
example, the coefficient in the finished goods regression in panel A of Table 3 is79.
This means that, relative to the GNP deflator, prices of finished goods on average change .79%
more in .a boom (the year of the fastest increase in the employment rate for each cycle) than in
the recession (the year of the lowest change in the employment rate for each cycle). The
coefficient of 4.54 on the 1974-1975 dummy in this regression means that the price of finished
goods rose 4.54% per year faster relative to GNP deflator in 1974-75 than in other periods.
In interpreting the results of Tables 3—5, we refer to relative prices that yield a positive
coefficient on the cyclical indicator as procyclical, and relative prices that yield a negative
coefficient as countercyclical. The regression coefficient measures the difference in the growth
rate of relative prices between the boom (defined as the year of fastest growth rate of detrended
employment in each cycle) and the recession (defined as the year of the lowest growth rate of
detrended employment in each cycle). The reason we need such a relative measure is that some
prices follow strong trends, and so may, for example, fall relative to the GNP deflator in both
booms and recessions.If the relative price does not have a trend, a positive regression
coefficient would say that, the relative price rises in a boom and falls in a recession.If, in
contrast, the relative price is always falling, a positive coefficient would say that it falls less in
the boom than it does in a recession. Either way, the relative price is procyclical in the sense that
relative to how they do in a recession relative prices rise in a boom. The same logic explains why
negative regression coefficients correspond to countercyclical relative prices.
Two kinds of results emerge from Table 3.First, finished goods do not show much
cyclical behavior relative to the GNP deflator, except for slightly countercyclical relative price
changes of finished durables. In contrast, prices of intermediate goods other than fuels are highly
procyclical. For example, in an average cycle manufacturing materials grow 3.32% faster relative
to the GNP deflator in a boom than in a recession. One exception to this is capital equipment,
which may be thought of as an intermediate good, and which shows mildly countercyclical prices.
By far the most procyclical are the prices of crude materials. In an average cycle, crude materials
prices rise 9.91% more relative to the GNP deflator in a boom than they do in a recession. The
procyclicality of prices clearly declines as one gets further in the production chain.32
Similar results come from the more narrowly defined commodities. As is well known,
prices of lumber, metals, paper and rubber are extremely procyclical.In contrast, prices of
finished durable goods, including household durables, machinery, and vehicles are
countercyclical. Commoditie! such as power and, surprisingly, chemicals do riot show much
action over the cycle.
Table 4 confirms the results of Table 3, except that the evidence is a little stronger.
Relative to the private sector average hourly earnings, prices of finished goods do not show any
cyclical behavior except that durables and capital equipment are more clearly countercyclical.
Relative prices of raw materials and intermediate goods are, in contrast, strongly procyclical,
except for capital equipment. Durable goods, such as household durables and vehicles, show the
opposite pattern. Tables 3 and 4 show very clearly that the place to look for productivity declines
in the recession is finished durable goods. Table 4 also suggests that procyclical real wages are
most pronounced in terms of durables—a finding common to real wage studies.
Table 5 presents some more novel results, namely those on relative prices. The
conclusion of Table 5 is that, in the production chain, the relative price of outputs to inputs is
countercycical. For example, relative to intermediate materials, finished goods grow 1.9% less in
the boom than in the recession. Relative to crude materials, this number is 9.1%. Throughout
this table, the result is that prices of finished goods are countercyclical relative to intermediate
goods and crude materials, and prices of intermediate goods are countercyclical relative to crude
materials.
Similar results emerge from Panel B of Table 5.Relativeto the price of lumber, those
of construction materials and household durables move countercyclically. Relative to the price of
manufacturing materials, those of vehicles, household durables, and machinery also move
countercyclically. Relative to the price of metals, those of vehicles, machinery, household
durables are again countercyclical.It is very clear from this table that the price of outputs
relative to that of inputs is countercyclical.
We draw three conclusions from Tables 3—5.First, the more finished are the goods, the
less procyclical are their relative prices. Second, the goods that exhibit the most countercyclical33
relative prices are durables. Third, outputs appreciate relative to inputs in the recession.
Importantly, these results are very similar to those found for the Great Depression period by Mills
(1936) and Means et a!. (1939) for a broader range of commodities. However, in the Great
Depression, real wages actually increased, and so these findings can be rationalized by the
observation that the relative price of goods with a greater labor content should be higher. Our
starting point, in contrast, is that in the postwar period real wages have been if anything
procyclical. Our next task is to interpret our findings for the postwar period.
C. Interpretation
The evidence in Tables 3—5 allows us to discriminate at least partially between various
business cycle stories. One story—which we associate with Long and Plosser (1983)—is that
technology shocks occur in the production of widely used raw materials or intermediate inputs,
and then spread across the economy through the input output matrix. These shocks need not even
be technology shocks; they can simply be price shocks to inputs supplied from outside the
economy, like oil. An IR version of this theory says that increasing returns are in the production
of raw materials or intermediate goods. As a result, these are the activities experiencing major
productivity declines in the recession. Both TS and IR versions of this story predict that the
relative price of raw materials and/or intermediate goods is countercyclical.
This story is inconsistent with the evidence in Tables 3—5. The tables confirm the
standard finding that the relative prices of raw materials are extremely procyclical. An exception
might be the case of oil in 1974—74 and 1979—80. However, except in these episodes, it is clear
that recessions are not driven by adverse shocks or endogenous productivity declines in raw
materials or in intermediate goods. This fact also poses a problem for the Long/Plosser theory of
comovement, which works through shocks to common inputs.
The evidence in Tables 3—5 is much more favorable to the view that productivity
changes occur at the later stages of the production process, particularly in durable goods. The IR
version of the story says that increasing returns occur in the final stages of production or
distribution of durables or possibly at the stage of producing capital equipment. The productivity34
of these stages declines in the recessions, and therefore the relative price of durables rises. The
reason that relative price movements are so pronounced for wide categories of goods is that the
comovement mechanism outlined in the previous section leads to synchronization of output and
productivity movements across sectors.
The TS version of this story is somewhat different, and harder to reconcile with the
evidence. In the TS world, the goods that get expensive in the recession are only the goods
experiencing adverse technology shocks, and not the goods whose output declines simply because
of comovernent. This is an important difference between IR and TS models: even though both
generate comovement with immobile labor and imperfect borrowing, the TS model exhibits
countercyclica.1 price movements only in the sectors with bad shocks.In contrast, the IR model
yields relative price increases in all increasing returns sectors in response to output declines. To
reconcile the TS model with the evidence, to bring on a recession one needs fairly widespread
adverse technology shocks in either the finished durable goods sectors or in the capital equipment
sector. We leave to the reader to evaluate the plausibility of pervasive adverse techno1oy shocks
in durable goods sectors as a cause of recessions.
Before concluding this section, we stress that the evidence in Tables 3-5isalso broadly
consistent with countercyclica.1 markups at the later production stages, especially in durabtes.
None of the evidence we have presented bears on the behavior of true productivity; all the action
might well be in markups. Hall's (1988a) earlier evidence can be interpreted in terms of
countercyclical markups, although his later (1988c) work points to true increasing returns. As we
mentioned before, however, Hall finds evidence of declining average costs and firms earning
close to zero profits. This finding points to countercyclical markups as a way to generate
procyclica.1 real wages. Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) present some evidence bearing
on this issue, and conclude that markups are countercyclical. At this point, we are not sure which
theory is right and leave this issue to a further investigation.
In summary, the evidence presented in this section enables us to at least partially
narrow down the range of theories consistent with the data.If economic fluctuations are driven
by technology shocks, these must be pervasive shocks across durable good industries, and not in35
intermediate input industries.If f1uctutions are driven by increasing returns, these must be in
the production and distribution of durable goods. Finally, fluctuations could be explained by
countercyclical markups in durable good industries, without productivity movements.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed models of business cycles driven by movements of
productivity. In particular, we have compared models in which these productivity movements
result from exogenous technology shocks with models in which they result from endogenous
movements along an increasing returns production function. We asked what kinds of assumptions
these models require to at least roughly fit the data. We have found that although these models
have very different sources of productivity changes, the assumptions required to fit the data are
very similar.First, to generate large movements in output in response to small changes in
productivity, these models rely on durability of goods. Second, to produce comovement of
outputs and labor inputs across various sectors of the economy, these models need to assume
specialized (immobile) labor and restricted borrowing. Third, to obtain large movements in labor
inputs in response to small changes in real wages or productivity, these models require very elastic
labor supply. Although none of these results is completely new, we hope that our emphasis on
identifying the critical building blocks of a market clearing model proves useful.
Our paper has also documented the countercyclical behavior of prices of outputs
relative to inputs, and of finished durables relative to wages and to the GNP deflator. This
evidence suggests that the place to look for technology shocks or increasing returns is at the final
stages of production, or in the distribution of durable goods.In the increasing returns
framework, this evidence supports illiuid markets models of recessions.In these models, time to
sale is long and therefore the marginal cost is high in the recession. The fact that such variable
liquidity costs are most plausible for durable goods is evidence favorable to this approach.
There are three topics that are closely related to the issues we have discussed, but that
we have not dealt with for lack of space. The first is downward rigid real wages as an alternative
to elastic labor supply. Even if one assumes downward rigid real wages, one still needs a source36
of productivity changes—such as increasing returns or technology shocks—to generate shifts in
labor demand. Downward rigid real wages would probably exacerbate the recession is a model of
the sort we described, because firms might shut down even when they would not with a flexible
real wage. Downward rigid real wages also make the comovernent story look more like an
aggregate demand story:instead of changes in relative prices we get changes in income and in
demand for individual goods.It remains to be explored what are some of the other consequences
of this assumption.
We have also ignored what s perhaps the most natural explanation of our evidence on
cyclical behavior of relative prices: countercyclical markups without productivity changes. There
are a number of reasons why producers of durables in a recession might not want to cutprices
even if marginal costs fall when input prices decline. Most plausibly we think that the customer
mix shifts in the recession away from buyers with eids tic demand, and so the profit maximizing
markup rises. This change of customer base might occur because most people would require
enormous price concessions to buy durables in a recession. The only remaining customers are
those who need to replace durables that have fallen apart and o have inelastic demand. The
change in the customer base might also occur if people who shop arund and therefore have
elastic demand are precisely the ones who have very low reservation prices in the recession—they
may be individuals who face the risk of unemployment or finns fearing bankruptcy. Such
theories of countercyclical markups, developed in particular by Phelps/Winter (1970), Okun
(1981), Stiglitz (1984), Bils (1986), Weitzman (1982), and Solow (1984), can probably explain most
of our evidence. Not surprisingly, one can build an endogenous business cycle model driven by
countercyclical markups without productivity changes.
Finally, all of our discussion has assumed a fixed capital stock in production.In
contrast, technology shocks models incorporate capital in the production function. Capital in
these models serves in part as a propagation device, whereby today's technology improvements
lead to an increase in the capital stock and therefore labor productivity tomorrow. There are akc
increasing returns models in which a business cycle is generated by movements in the capita!
stock (Shleifer 1986, Kiyotaki 1988).In these models, waves of investment raise productivity and37
income, and so lead to increased demand for goods. The higher demand for goods in turn
justifies the initial investment outlay. Unifying the increasing returns models discussed in this
paper:with increasing returns investment models remains a topic for future work.38
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